What\u27s a Constitution for Anyway--Of History and Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal by Kramer, Larry
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 3
1996
What's a Constitution for Anyway--Of History and
Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal
Larry Kramer
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Larry Kramer, What's a Constitution for Anyway--Of History and Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 885
(1996)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol46/iss3/15
WHAT'S A CONSTITUTION FOR
ANYWAY? OF HISTORY AND THEORY,
BRUCE ACKERMAN AND THE NEW
DEAL
Larry Kramer"
What should we make of United States v. Lopez?' Initial re-
actions were largely of the Chicken Little variety and filled with
dire predictions of renewed judicial shackles imposed on a ham-
strung federal government. Sober second thoughts have been, well,
sober, and many observers now say that Lopez may not be such a
big deal after all. This could just be wishful thinking, or trying not
to get one's hopes up (as the case may be). But if the discussion
at this Conference is any indication, a growing number of experts
have concluded that sweeping judicial revolution is unlikely.
So which is it? Is Lopez a sport, a judicial shot across the
bow to remind Congress to take its responsibilities seriously? Or
have the ghosts of Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter, and
McReynolds returned to haunt us after all? We can't possibly
know-yet. Judicial decisions are not inherently revolutionary; they
are not inherently anything. They are what we choose to make
them. They may contain seeds-Lopez, for example, certainly could
provide the jumping-off point for a new judicial assault on federal
power. But whether a particular decision becomes a source of
radical change or merely a note in the casebooks depends on what
the Court makes of it afterwards, and Lopez could just as easily
turn out to be another Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.2
* Professor of Law, New York University Law School. I am grateful to participants
in the NYU Legal History Colloquium and the NYU Constitutional Theory Colloqui-
um-and especially to Larry Sager and Chris Eisgruber-for reading and commenting on
an earlier draft. Thanks for comments also go to Richard Bernstein, Barry Cushman,
Marty Flaherty, Michael Herz, Don Herzog, Larry Lessig, Rick Pildes, David Richards,
and Reuel Schiller.
1. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
2. 483 U.S. 825, 831-42 (1987) (invalidating a California state commission's imposi-
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All this debate about the meaning of Lopez, in other words, is
not-cannot be-about what Lopez "really" means or "really" does.
It is about what we should make it mean or do.
If the choice of meanings for Lopez is up for grabs, it will be
powerfully influenced by the framework we use to give the deci-
sion its context. In his paper, Mark Tushnet asks whether Bruce
Ackerman's theory of "constitutional moments" helps us to mea-
sure the significance of Lopez.3 Tushnet concludes that it does,
that Ackerman's theory may, in fact, "provide the best account" of
recent constitutional developments.4
This is a surprising conclusion, if only because Tushnet never
makes clear whether he agrees with or approves of Ackerman's
framework. That Ackerman's theory might have something to say
about Lopez is not surprising. Any reasonably comprehensive theo-
ry would have something to say about the decision, and if
Ackerman purports to do anything, it is to be comprehensive. The
question is whether what Ackerman's theory has to say is useful or
desirable, and that depends on whether the theory is a useful or
desirable way to think about constitutional developments.
In addressing this question, I want to focus particularly on
Ackerman's proposal for interpreting the Constitution. This is, after
all, the book's main point and most original contribution:
Ackerman combines claims about the nature of American democra-
cy with a story about American history to justify a particular way
of understanding and justifying developments in constitutional law.
It is this approach that Tushnet invokes to explore the possible
meaning of Lopez.
Other commentators have discussed Ackerman's political theo-
ry, some of which is old hat, some highly controversial.5 My point
tion of an access easement condition on a building permit under the Takings Clause be-
cause the condition did not serve a public purpose).
3. Ackerman's theory is presented in 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FoUN-
DATIONS (1991). Ackerman promises supporting details and additional historical evidence
in volumes two and three, but the first volume lays his theoretical groundwork.
4. Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment? Lopez and Constitutional Theo-
ry, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 845, 875 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Symposium, Bruce Ackerman's We the People, 104 ETHICS 446, 446-535
(1994). In the category of "old hat" are Ackerman's discussion of human nature and his
claim that American political practice has two tracks. As Ackerman himself recognizes,
the insight that men and women are neither wholly virtuous nor utterly craven, that they
cannot be expected to devote their lives entirely to the public good but can be expected
to assume some civic responsibilities, is hardly new and was not so when The Federalist
was written. Similarly, the notion that there are two kinds of law, one superior to the
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is different: even if one grants Ackerman his claims about "dualist
democracy" and normal versus higher politics, one should still
reject the principles of constitutional interpretation that he urges
follow from them. We need a different framework to make sense
of a decision like Lopez.
The analysis starts by describing Ackerman's approach to
constitutional interpretation. Most commentators focus on the "con-
stitutional moment" as his key contribution. But the notion that
constitutional moments occur, even that such moments amend the
Constitution, is not, by itself, all that interesting or important. What
matters is that, when a constitutional moment occurs, it establishes
a new "constitutional regime." Constitutional regimes consist of
broad principles that reflect the basic goals and priorities of funda-
mental law. Articulated by courts in the years after a constitutional
moment occurs, these principles redefine, and to a significant de-
gree restructure, the entire constitutional system. Hence, one who
other, is at the heart of The Federalist No. 78 as well as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), and has been a universally accepted truism throughout American
history.
The category of principles that are controversial includes, most notably, Ackerman's
claim that the people can legitimately make whatever law they want so long as it is done
in a way that makes clear that it is "We the People" who are speaking. Other commenta-
tors have pointed to problems with this premise: that certain rights are needed to make
sense of the claim that what follows is democratic, that still other rights may be neces-
sary to ensure adequate space for private citizenship, and so on. See, e.g., Don Herzog,
Democratic Credentials, 104 ETHICS 467, 468-71 (1994). Ackerman even concedes that his
premise is problematic in strictly normative terms. Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitan-
ism, 104 ETHICS 516, 517-20 (1994). But, he maintains, the absolute power of the people
legitimately to make (or unmake) whatever law they want is, for better or worse, an
underlying premise of our Constitution-shown by the fact that "from the Founding to the
present, our Constitution has coexisted peacefully with grievous injustice." Id. at 518.
Ackerman's response here seems to me a clumsy sort of pragmatism. As Miriam and
William Galston have pointed out, the Declaration of Independence is evidence (and only
the most obvious evidence) of the Founding generation's belief that governments are insti-
tuted to protect certain natural rights and lose their legitimacy if they fail to protect these
rights. Miriam Galston & William Galston, Reason, Consent, and the U.S. Constitution:
Bruce Ackerman's We the People, 104 ETHICS 446, 455-56 (1994). Grant that the Found-
ing generation failed to meet this ideal when it declined to abolish slavery-though I
would hardly describe antebellum politics and the Civil War as a period of "peaceful
coexistence." Grant, too, that the United States has since committed or permitted its fair
share of injustice (still does). Why does it follow that any injustice the people choose to
pursue is therefore legitimate? Why because we have not managed to perfect our constitu-
tional order is it okay to make that order as imperfect, as unjust, as undemocratic as a
mobilized majority chooses? Ackerman may be on firm ground in criticizing those who
insist on treating the Constitution as a mandate for perfect justice. But his position is
much weaker when he assumes that the alternative must therefore be substantively uncon-
strained majority rule.
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embraces Ackerman's theory must ask whether a decision like
Lopez is consistent with the existing constitutional regime, or (as
Tushnet considers) whether it signals the creation of a new one.
Part II examines the motivation for engaging in this sort of
interpretive enterprise, which turns out to be that it encourages a
desirable attitude toward self-government, an attitude Ackerman
sums up in the phrase "private citizenship." A private citizen, in
Ackerman's nomenclature, is someone who lives a conventional
private life most of the time, taking time out perhaps to follow
important public issues and to vote, but who is willing to become
more engaged in deciding what is best for the nation-to become
more the kind of citizen imagined by civic humanists-when
events make this necessary.
Part 1l questions whether this motivation adequately justifies
the enterprise Ackerman wants to promote. Even conceding that
private citizenship is worth encouraging, why should it be the
foremost consideration in constitutional interpretation (as it is for
Ackerman)? Aren't there other considerations of equal or greater
importance? On closer inspection, the "constitutional regime" turns
out to be a rather ham-handed interpretive device. It takes broad
principles developed in one context and under one set of circum-
stances and recklessly engrafts these onto other problems under
other circumstances, subverting or distorting many of the
Constitution's particular aims along the way. Governing is complex
business, and because governmental institutions are interdependent
and sensitive, even small changes can have unforeseen effects;
handled improperly, these can become very large. Ackerman's
regime theory directs courts to restructure all sorts of institutional
arrangements based on abstractions that were not developed for the
purpose, and with no reason to believe these are suited for their
new mission. Such imprudence is likely only to make any prob-
lems worse. Part IV illustrates, using some of Ackerman's own
examples, in particular, Reconstruction, Lochner, and the New
Deal.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REGIMES
How does Ackerman's theory tell us to think about a decision
like Lopez? Like most commentators, Tushnet concentrates on
Ackerman's argument that there are "constitutional moments" dur-
ing which the citizenry is engaged in politics in an especially in-
[Vol. 46:885
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tensive, civic-minded way.6 At such moments, Ackerman says,
"We the People" speak for ourselves in what James Madison once
called our "highest sovereign capacity."7 Tushnet asks whether we
are now experiencing a constitutional moment, whether Lopez is
part of one. But what if it is? Something is happening, but what is
it supposed to mean?
One implication is that the Constitution is amended at such
junctures. Certainly this is true if the moment is expressed through
what Ackerman calls "the classical system" of higher lawmaking,
viz, the procedures laid out in Article V of the Constitution.8 But
it's not news that the Constitution can be amended under Arti-
cle V. Somewhat more novel is Ackerman's claim that such mo-
ments can produce an amendment outside Article V procedures,9
and it is this possibility that Tushnet explores with Lopez.
Ackerman's proposal to have courts recognize amendments
adopted outside Article V has provoked some negative rumblings
from legal scholars, and certainly its logical and legal bases are
contestable.'" But even this is mostly just a debate about vocabu-
lary. For Ackerman's system still calls for the Supreme Court first
to make some sort of "switch in time" and then to codify the
results by articulating the relevant constitutional principles in au-
thoritative decisions," which is pretty much how things already
happen. True, Ackerman's theory technically requires the Court to
make this switch if political events speak loudly and clearly
enough. But we know already that the Court will invariably do so
with or without Ackerman-a point captured in the adage about
judicial decisions following election returns. As a practical matter,
then, the only consequence of embracing Ackerman's theory is to
relabel as "constitutional amendments" what formerly we were
6. See Tushnet, supra note 4, at 847-52 (explaining that "although constitutional mo-
ments may occur, they may not be the only times when constitutional transformation
occurs").
7. See Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVMONS ON THE ADOPTON OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrTUON 546, 547 (Jona-
than Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888).
8. ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 267.
9. According to Ackerman, this "modem system" of amending the Constitution has
roots that stretch back to Jefferson's election in 1800 but "came into its own" and is best
exemplified by the New Deal controversy of the 1930s. Id. at 267-68.
10. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST.
COMMENTARY 115, 140-44 (1994); Lawrence G. Sager, The Birth Logic of a Democratic
Constitution 4 (Sept. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
11. See ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 268.
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content to call changes in established doctrine. Does the label
really matter?
In theory, I suppose, the amendment label should make the
Court's articulated principles harder to change. In practice, howev-
er, the Court can always find room to maneuver even when deal-
ing with textual amendments adopted under Article V. I could cite
the Due Process Clause for support here, though that may be un-
fair given its open-ended language and elastic purpose. So look
instead at the Court's doctrinal flip-flops in interpreting the various
provisions of the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments-not to men-
tion the long freeze it imposed on the Fourteenth Amendment in
decisions like the Slaughter-House Cases,2  United States v.
Reese,3 United States v. Cruikshank,"4 and the Civil Rights Cas-
es.15 True, labeling something an amendment makes overruling it
outright technically impossible. But the likelihood of that happen-
ing even without the label is exceedingly low, particularly given
the option to proceed by attrition through decisional law-low
enough, at least, that this alone is not enough to make Ackerman's
theory useful in measuring the significance of a decision like
Lopez.
16
Ackerman's unique, and potentially important, contribution
comes from a different feature of the theory: his notion that consti-
tutional moments give rise to what he calls "constitutional re-
gimes." A number of commentators, myself included, have criti-
cized Ackerman for unduly compressing the story of constitutional
change. 7 Constitutional values, we have argued, are not always,
12. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (rejecting a Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment
attack on a Louisiana statute granting a monopoly over the slaughterhouse business in the
New Orleans area).
13. 92 U.S. 214, 216-17, 221 (1875) (striking down a federal penal statute addressing
obstruction of voting rights as outside the constitutional powers of Congress).
14. 92 U.S. 542, 559 (1875) (overturning convictions under a federal voting rights
penal statute).
15. 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as outside the
scope of congressional authority conferred in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments).
16. A colleague suggested in conversation that the importance of Ackerman's work
may simply be that it reminds us to attend to the roots of constitutional lawmaking in
expressions by the people. Constitutional theory had begun to drift very far from concern
for popular sovereignty, and it may well have been worthwhile to draw attention back to
these roots. But if embracing Ackerman's theory would not change anything about our
actual practices, the fuss generated by his book hardly seems worthwhile.
17. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of
Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 791 (1992);
Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 276
[Vol. 46:885
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or only, made in cataclysmic political upheavals. They are shaped
in smaller increments, by accretion. Developments take place in
different areas at different times, in an ongoing, overlapping se-
quence: at some point, criminal procedure issues come to dominate
the Court's docket and dramatic changes are made; while these are
still being assimilated the Court shifts to equality issues, then to
separation of powers, then back to equality; in the meantime, some
older problems respecting the scope of federal power reappear, and
so on. Within each of these areas, a doctrinal revolution of sorts
may take place. Each controversy is dealt with as it arises, with
resolutions that become embedded in our general constitutional
sensibilities and contribute, in turn, to further evolution.
But the critics-and, once again, I include myself here-have
been unfair. Ackerman knows that constitutional change happens all
the time. 8 But, he says, there are moments and there are mo-
ments. Most instances of constitutional politics do not involve self-
conscious choice by a mobilized citizenry---do not, in other words,
involve constitutional lawmaking by the people acting in their
highest sovereign capacity. Moments of this description are rarer;
indeed, Ackerman says, we have experienced only three in our
history: the Founding itself, Reconstruction, and the New Deal. 9
n.39 (1992); Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of Ackerman's We the
People, 9 CONsT. COMMENTARY 309, 324 (1992).
18. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 196:
If we turn to constitutional movements that have had an important,
but somewhat less sweeping impact on constitutional values and structures, the
causal story is richer. The civil rights movement of the modem republic, the
women's suffrage movement of the middle republic, the Jeffersonian and Jack-
sonian 'revolutions' of the early republic all serve as important examples of
successful constitutional politics.
19. Some critics argue that other constitutional innovations fit Ackerman's criteria of
signalling, proposal, mobilized public deliberation, and codification-a point that, if true,
renders Ackerman's notion of synthetic interpretation impossibly difficult and reduces the
significance of any principles adopted. How about the election of 1832 and the question
of a National Bank? Or the election of 1876 and the end of Reconstruction? Or the post-
Watergate election of 1976? Mike McConnell goes so far as to suggest that there may be
as many as eleven moments that satisfy Ackerman's criteria. McConnell, supra note 10, at
142-43. Although Ackerman has not yet addressed such claims directly, he apparently
regards the quality of public engagement at these putative moments as less intense and
less profound than during the three moments he defends. See ACKERMAN, supra note 3,
at 40-41. This does not explain why the quality of public deliberation during other peri-
ods was not high enough to qualify, but here Tushnet provides an answer. The stringency
of Ackerman's conditions, he suggests, can be justified on formalist grounds: to reduce
the risk of politicians falsely claiming to speak for the people, Ackerman screens out all
but the clearest examples of higher lawmaking. See Tushnet, supra note 4, at 858-62.
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What makes these rare constitutional moments special is that
they generate profound changes in bedrock constitutional princi-
ples-establishing, quite literally, a new "constitutional regime." A
constitutional regime, according to Ackerman, consists of "the
matrix of institutional relationships and fundamental values that are
usually taken as the constitutional baseline in normal political
life."2 Such regimes should, he urges, constitute the "basic unit
of analysis" for interpreting the Constitution.2'
The constitutional regime, in other words, is an interpretive
device for remaking constitutional law. It consists of general princi-
ples that reorganize doctrinal analysis across the whole spectrum of
constitutional problems. The "middle republic" launched during
Reconstruction stood, broadly speaking, for a profound commitment
to freedom and equality, a commitment applicable to issues beyond
slavery and civil rights-including, most notably, freedom of con-
tract and the right to own property, and thus leading plausibly (if
not inexorably) to Lochner.22 Similarly, the "modem republic"
inaugurated by the New Deal endorses a principle of activist gov-
ernment that demands rethinking constitutional relationships on
matters reaching well beyond economic regulation and the social
safety net-including, for example, our constitutional commitment
to equality (hence Brown) and to individual autonomy (hence
Griswold).' It is this notion that leads Tushnet, in the last section
of his paper, to ask whether recent political developments, includ-
ing the 1994 elections and Contract With America, as well as
Lopez, stand for some general principle of evaporating government
power.24
Note, however, that the normative propositions embodied in a
constitutional regime are not themselves enacted, or even debated,
as such. Constitutional moments are triggered by particular prob-
lems, and the process of ratification (whether or not carried out
under Article V) consists of securing the acceptance of definite
proposals placed before the people for their consideration. So far as
the public at large was concerned, the issues on the table during
the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment and the election of
20. ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 59.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 100-01.
23. Id. at 133-58 (discussing Brown and Griswold).
24. See Tushnet, supra note 4, at 869-75 ("[T]he present constitutional moment, if it is
one, may involve the evaporation rather than the devolution of public power.").
[Vol. 46:885
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1866 consisted of putting the South in its place (by disenfranchis-
ing former Confederate officials and repudiating the Confederate
war debt) and securing basic civil rights for the newly freed slaves.
Similarly, the controversy of the late 1930s involved persuading the
Supreme Court to uphold legislation enacted during Roosevelt's
Second New Deal, primarily laws regulating important national
markets and establishing the Social Security system. The engaged
public-the "We the People" Ackerman celebrates-was never
asked to adopt the broad principles that come to define its new
constitutional regime. Insofar as such principles were discussed
(and obviously there was lots of talk about equality during Recon-
struction and about state activism during the 1930s), it was in the
context of these specific proposals.
The point is this: the people themselves, in the midst of the
political upheavals that qualify under Ackerman's theory as genuine
constitutional moments, did not think they were fundamentally
restructuring their entire constitutional order. Many understood that
something important was happening, that more was at stake than
the kind of minor repair reflected in an Eleventh or Twelfth
Amendment, but most or all participants saw their action as bound-
ed by the controversy before them. Had a proposal to go beyond
this been put to them directly, had "the people" been asked to
authorize the sort of systematic reordering called for by
Ackerman's regime theory, they most likely would have said no-a
point Ackerman willingly acknowledges.'
So where do the principles come from? Who defines the
scope, who creates the meaning, of a constitutional regime? Why
courts (of course). According to Ackerman, judges extract a
regime's underlying principles from the concrete proposals enacted
by the people, "translat[ing] the rare successes of constitutional
politics into cogent doctrinal principles capable of controlling poli-
tics into the indefinite future."'26 He elaborates with a metaphor:
Think of the American Republic as a railroad train, with
the judges ... sitting in the caboose, looking backward.
What they see are the mountains and valleys of dualistic
constitutional experience, most notably the peaks of consti-
tutional meaning elaborated during the [prior constitutional
moments]. As the train moves forward in history, it is
25. See ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 96-98.
26. Id. at 290.
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harder for the judges to see the traces of volcanic ash that
marked each mountain's political emergence onto the legal
landscape. At the same time, a different perspective be-
comes more available: as the second mountain moves into
the background, it becomes easier to see that there is now
a mountain range out there that can be described in a
comprehensive way.'
This task of translating constitutional politics into normative
principles consists of two steps: First, courts give meaning to the
transformation that just took place, articulating appropriate "princi-
ples . . . capable of generalized application" by "abstracting the
core constitutional doctrines from the mass of statutory material
that has gained popular support." 8 Then, courts synthesize these
principles with those from previous regimes, "integrat[ing] the new
principles added by the last transformation into the older tradi-
tion."29 "The task," Ackerman concludes, "is to develop the entire
set of constitutional principles in a comprehensive way that harmo-
nizes the deeper aspirations."3
It is this notion of a constitutional regime that gives
Ackerman's theory its bite, that makes its adoption potentially
meaningful. Without the regime feature, Ackerman's proposal is
journalism, theory without meaningful consequences. With it, the
conclusion that we're living in a constitutional moment has much
more than journalistic significance. It authorizes-indeed, com-
pels-courts to engage in a profound task of constitutional reinter-
pretation. It requires them to articulate a set of broad new princi-
ples and to integrate these with existing principles in a way that
has implications across the entire constitutional firmament.3'
27. Id. at 98-99.
28. Id. at 98, 283.
29. Id. at 161.
30. Id. at 98. See id. at 92-94, 116, 127-29, 289-90 (explaining how the amendments
"represented a good deal less than a comprehensive synthesis of the Founding and Recon-
struction").
31. Given the court-centered nature of this theory, it is ironic to hear Ackerman tell us
that we need "to move beyond the court-centered view that afflicts the modem profession-
al narrative" and that lawyers and judges "must resist the temptation to make the Su-
preme Court the alpha as well as the omega." Id. at 59.
894 [Vol. 46:885
WHATS A CONSTITUTION FOR ANYWAY?
II. JUSTIFICATIONS AND MOTIVATIONS
An obvious question to ask at this point is, why engage in this
interpretive enterprise of searching for constitutional moments,
defining constitutional regimes, and synthesizing these over time?
One could promote the theory on straight normative grounds and
argue that viewing constitutional developments this way yields the
"best" Constitution among available alternatives. But Ackerman
does not make this defense, which is just as well given the size-
able leap of faith required to believe that an engaged, mobilized
majority always makes the "best" law, constitutional or other-
wise.32 Instead, as Tushnet explains, Ackerman's theory can more
easily be defended as an "interpretive one," i.e., a theory justified
because it "provides an account of the way the people of the Unit-
ed States actually understand their constitutional tradition."33
Phrased this way, the case for Ackerman's theory still seems
weak. An obvious challenge: why does that make it a good theory?
One cannot promote the theory on popular sovereignty grounds
without first defending the theory's premise that popular sovereign-
ty ought to be determinative. Besides, at least as stated here by
Tushnet, the premise seems patently false; Ackerman's theory does
not describe "how the people of the United States understand their
tradition." Just ask your non-law friends, or your parents, or your
parents' friends, where they think constitutional law comes from. I
am confident that the story you get back will not resemble
Ackerman's. Certainly my mother and her friends don't think along
these lines, and I'm pretty sure they are typical in this respect. If
the average person thinks about problems of constitutional interpre-
tation at all, he or she probably holds one of the conventional
views: textualist or originalist or realist ("the Supreme Court makes
it"). There is an awareness of the amendment process, but con-
ceived in a wholly conventional way, with none of the underpin-
nings of Ackerman's "dualist democracy" and no sense of a "mod-
em system" of extra-textual amendments.
For what it is worth, when Ackerman speaks of a collective
understanding, he does not appear to mean that of the general
32. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 852-54 ("[Tlhere is simply no good reason to accept that
assertion or its supporting ground."). Think Nazi Germany for the extreme example,
though Ackerman himself observes that "[i]t should not require the horror of a holocaust
before Americans recognize that dualist democracy is not the best form of government
available for modem society." Ackerman, supra note 5, at 533 (emphasis in original).
33. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 854.
89519961
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population anyway. Rather, he privileges the professional narrative,
the narrative constructed by lawyers and judges.34 But I am even
more certain that Ackerman's theory does not fit the understanding
of this group. His book created a stir, after all, only because it did
not conform to what this community already thought. (Nor would
Ackerman want it any other way; I mean, who wants to write
something that simply describes what everybody already thinks?)
So perhaps this is not the best way to understand Ackerman's
theory either. At a later point in his paper, Tushnet suggests that
Ackerman's approach may be desirable "because it supports or
generates a normatively attractive vision of our national identi-
ty."35 Tushnet never follows up the allusion, but it suggests some-
thing different from either a simple normative claim (that
Ackerman's theory yields the best Constitution) or a simple posi-
tive one (that this is how people understand our constitutional
tradition). It suggests a mix of both: that Ackerman's theory may
provide the most normatively attractive account of our constitution-
al tradition that is also consistent (more or less) with the actual
course of that tradition. Other readers have interpreted Ackerman
this way, which is also consistent with his own subsequent descrip-
tion.36
Characterizing Ackerman's theory along this line enhances its
plausibility, since most theorists would prefer an approach that is
consistent with our historical tradition while being normatively
attractive-indeed, many believe that whether a theory is consistent
with historical tradition is part of what makes it normatively attrac-
tive.37 But does Ackerman's theory do this? Is his, in fact, the
34. ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 38 ("While it has many interpreters-from profession-
al historians to T.V. actors-I believe that the ongoing constitutional narrative constructed
by lawyers and judges is entitled to a central place. This professional narrative has the
most direct impact upon the ordinary lives led by all of us.").
35. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 856.
36. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 5, at 533-35; Kent Greenawalt, Dualism and Its
Status, 104 ETHICS 480, 484 & n.9 (1994).
37. This is, for example, the central premise of originalism as well as a core feature
of Ronald Dworkin's work. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE ch. 7 (1986). Even
scholars who purport to be skeptical about using history and past practice typically in-
clude it as an element of their analysis; the real disagreement is more about how, not
whether, to take this consideration into account. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE PROB-
LEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE ch. 10 (1990); CASS SuNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTrruION ch.
4 (1993). Still, the point is not self-evident. Why should we be limited by past practice
in thinking about what theory is best? Why shouldn't we develop a theory on purely
normative grounds, treating departures from historical understandings as a practical prob-
lem of implementation rather than a potential constraint on the theory itself? Part III
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most normatively attractive way to understand our constitutional
tradition? This depends, first, on what "our tradition" is said to
consist of; second, on what the alternatives are; and third, on what
makes Ackerman's theory more normatively attractive than the
alternatives.
Start with the problem of characterizing our tradition-an in-
credibly difficult task. At what level of generality should the inqui-
ry be made? Which facts count and how much weight do they get?
Don't we need a normative framework with which to organize the
facts? Think of Burke condemning the nasty French Revolution and
celebrating English balance while all but ignoring the regicide,
religious persecutions, and sundry other massacres of the Interreg-
num." Characterizing an American constitutional tradition is no
easier. We have much to be proud of; much the United States has
done has increased liberty and equality and made the world a
better place. But what about slavery, racism, the genocide of Na-
tive Americans? How should we think about Know-Nothingism,
McCarthyism, the movement to ban the Mormon church, the in-
ternment of Japanese-Americans? Where do we fit the tradition of
anti-intellectualism that began with the Second Great Awakening,
or the prissy intolerance and social bigotry that has characterized
America from the Puritans to the Progressives to today's champi-
ons of political correctness (left and right)? Burke understood that
describing a tradition means talking about particular practices.
Aren't these all part of our tradition? How should they and myriad
other facts, positive and negative, be integrated?
Ackerman ducks such questions by defining the tradition at a
level of generality so high as to make comparative evaluation
difficult. The defining principle of American constitutionalism, he
declares, is nothing less-and nothing more-than a commitment to
popular sovereignty: but popular sovereignty of a particular sort,
which Ackerman labels "dualist democracy." '39 By "dualism"
Ackerman means that, within the terms of a general commitment to
popular government, we distinguish further between decisions made
suggests one answer, because a theory developed without regard for past practice, and
even more one developed in spite of it, is likely to be a bad theory. Beyond this, howev-
er, and even though I agree with Ackerman on this point, I want to put such questions
aside; they require a lengthy discussion that would take us too far afield.
38. See Don Herzog, Puzzling Through Burke, 19 POL. THEORY 336, 342-59 (1991)
(discussing the problem of characterizing tradition with specific reference to Burke and his
selective choice of facts).
39. See ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at ch. 1.
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by the people's representatives in the course of ordinary politics
and decisions made by the people themselves during rare periods
of mobilized deliberation.'4 Ackerman's theory of constitutional
moments and constitutional regimes is designed to give maximum
effect to this distinction-to recognize the value of decisions made
in normal politics while remaining especially alert to decisions
made by the people (and relying on courts to preserve the people's
handiwork from erosion in the course of ordinary politics).
Ackerman is on shaky ground even at this high level of gener-
ality. Most obviously, he ignores an equally prominent natural
rights strand in American constitutionalism (of which, more below).
But why should we characterize tradition at this abstract level
anyway? As suggested above, we won't be able even to begin
thinking usefully about what our tradition "is" until we get beyond
generalities and deal with the grubby details. Nevertheless, having
noted this problem, I want to put it aside and concede that dualism
is an important facet of a distinctively American constitutional
tradition. To attempt more would simply mean a long discussion
leading to the obvious conclusion that there are many competing,
equally persuasive versions of "our" tradition.
This brings me to the question of alternatives. Ackerman dis-
cusses three, which he labels "monistic democracy," "rights
foundationalism," and "Burkean historicism." He criticizes all three
for ignoring the dualist foundation of the American Constitution.4'
"Monism," for example, is said to hold that courts should never set
aside laws made by democratically elected legislatures. And, as
thus stated, the problem from Ackerman's perspective is obvious:
this theory enables politicians to subvert decisions made by the
people through laws enacted when most citizens are detached from
public affairs or thinking only of their own particularistic con-
cerns.4' "Rights foundationalism," in contrast, has a different
weakness-insufficient rather than misplaced democratic sensibili-
ties. As Ackerman describes it, this theory holds that certain rights
always and necessarily trump majoritarian decisions, rights identi-
fied and justified on philosophical grounds, without regard for
whether the people actually adopted them. Wrong, says Ackerman,
for our Constitution is "democratic first, rights-protecting second":
40. Id. at 6-7.
41. See id. at ch. 1.
42. Id. at 7-10.
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the rights existing to be enforced against legislative action are
those (and only those) adopted by the people in their higher law-
making capacity.43 Finally, "Burkean historicism," which is really
just another name for common-law adjudication, stresses the evolu-
tion of doctrine by increments-too much so for Ackerman, who
maintains that the emphasis on gradualism unduly tames what the
people create through constitutional politics.'
Anyone familiar with the theories Ackerman discusses can see
that his criticisms exaggerate their "non-dualist" tendencies. None
of these approaches is as dismissive of the idea of higher law
made by the people as Ackerman pretends; each, in fact, recogniz-
es the same distinction between decisions of the people and deci-
sions of their representatives-though none handles this distinction
in quite the same way as Ackerman does.
For example, none of the "monists" cited by Ackerman45 (nor
anyone else doing American constitutional law) has ever main-
tained that our Constitution embraces a principle of legislative
supremacy. Nor did any of these scholars, except perhaps
Woodrow Wilson, argue that it should. All of them, Wilson includ-
ed, recognize that the Constitution establishes supreme law that
cannot be contradicted by the political branches-where it speaks
clearly. Those troubled by the so-called countermajoritarian difficul-
ty simply believe that, where the Constitution is not clear, courts
have no business overriding legislatures. In Ackerman's jargon,
they follow a sort of "dualist clear statement rule": if the people
have spoken clearly, as evidenced by the text (and, for some pro-
ponents of this view, the history) of the Constitution, the people's
decision governs; if they have not spoken clearly, legislative judg-
ments about what the people want are better than those of a court.
There are, we know, problems with this view-problems examined
endlessly during the almost forty years that this question has preoc-
cupied constitutional theorists-but that it fails to recognize the
superior power of the people to make higher law is not one of
them.
Rights foundationalists also recognize the power of the people
to make higher law-though not necessarily to quite the same
extent or in quite the same way as Ackerman does. Start with the
43. Id. at 10-16.
44. Id. at 16-21.
45. Ackerman mentions Woodrow Wilson, James Bradley Thayer, Charles Beard, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Robert Jackson, Alexander Bickel, and John Hart Ely. See id. at 7.
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narrowest version of this theory: that certain rights must be guaran-
teed before we can even call a decision democratic. Not only is
this position consistent with Ackerman's dualism, particularly if the
remainder of the field is left to the kind of democratic politics he
champions, but (as other commentators have observed) it actually
seems required by the theory-a point Ackerman has so far failed
adequately to address.'
There are more robust versions of rights foundationalism. Yet
even these do not deny the validity of dualism, only its exclusivity.
One might, for example, want to defend a larger set of entrenched
rights. But no one takes this claim so far as to argue that such
rights exhaust the field-that no further rights may be created or
denied. At most, this position entails a modest restriction on
majoritarian rule. Ackerman insists, implausibly, that the American
commitment to popular sovereignty is inconsistent with any such
restriction.' Yet the Declaration of Independence is (pardon the
pun) self-evidently based on a natural rights philosophy, and it
merely restates commonly held views that were not repudiated
during the critical years that followed and have persisted through-
out American history.' Whatever else it may be, our tradition has
always included, alongside popular sovereignty, a notion of inalien-
able rights-rights that government cannot take away, rights that
governments are, in fact, established to protect. Yes, as Ackerman
points out in trying to minimize the importance of this tradition,
the acceptance of slavery stands as a big contradiction here. But a
bloody war was fought to repudiate that contradiction, fought partly
46. See, e.g., Galston & Galston, supra note 5, at 449 (explaining that "the very con-
siderations that incline Ackerman to give weight to popular consent as a basis of legiti-
macy entail constraints on the content of popular will that Ackerman fails to recognize");
Herzog, supra note 5, at 468-69 (explaining "that some rights are required to make sense
of the claim that whatever ensues is democratic"). Ackerman's response to this criticism
was that "dualist theory [may not be] unalterably opposed to the protection of (a narrow
set of) inalienable rights," but it does not require entrenched rights either. "if the people
wish to commit suicide by stripping its members of their participatory rights, popular
sovereignty has already died and elites would make matters worse by pretending that they
could breathe life back into the corpse." Ackerman, supra note 5, at 531-32. But this
response misses the point while, in effect, conceding it. To see why, consider the follow-
ing question: If a proposal to repeal the First Amendment were made, could it be resisted
at the outset, before it was adopted, on the ground that it is illegitimate, or merely be-
cause it is a bad idea?
47. ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 13-15.
48. See DONALD MEYER, THE DEMOCRATIC ENLIGHTENMENT 111-12 (1976); Martin S.
Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523,
588-89 (1995); supra note 5.
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on the premise of fulfilling the natural rights tradition embodied in
the Declaration."
In any event, the most common use of arguments from moral
or political philosophy-the use made by lawyers and judges who
actually work with the Constitution-does not depend on en-
trenched rights or an unamendable Constitution. It doesn't need to,
because the rights provisions already in the Constitution are suffi-
cient for their purposes. Lawyers and judges face a more practical
problem: figuring out how to interpret and apply existing rights
provisions over time, as new circumstances arise and old ones
change. Resort to moral or political philosophy in this context is a
method of gap filling, "non-dualist" only if one assumes that the
people disapprove of using such sources for guidance in interpreta-
tion. But there is no reason to assume that; certainly there is no
reason to believe that "We the People" mind moral and political
philosophy more than the generalizations manufactured by judges
looking back from Ackerman's caboose.
Finally, nothing in the approach that Ackerman calls "Burkean
historicism" says to ignore or subvert changes made by the people
through constitutional politics. On the contrary, a judge who under-
states or repudiates such changes is acting improperly. A common-
law approach emphasizes the need to incorporate new law into a
preexisting framework, which may make its adherents less enthusi-
astic about abrupt changes than Ackerman would like. But a com-
mon-law or historicist approach in no way denies the validity or
importance of constitutional politics and higher law. It simply
encourages a different attitude toward integrating these products
into existing law.
The point is, we are not choosing between a theory that ac-
cepts dualism and theories that reject it. We are, rather, choosing
among theories that recognize the significance of higher law made
49. Lincoln's argument for interpreting the Constitution in light of the Declaration of
Independence is well known: seeing that the nation was not prepared to abolish slavery,
he argued, the Framers instead set it on a slow road to extinction. See CREATED EQUAL?
THE COMPLEM LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 82, 298 (Paul M. Angle ed.,
Midway Reprint 1985). Ackerman replies that Lincoln's views were "far more complex,
and less foundationalist" than is typically assumed. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 518 n.4.
I'm not sure what Ackerman means by this oblique comment, but Lincoln did not invent
this argument anyway; nor was he the only person to make it. This was, in fact, a stan-
dard piece of antislavery rhetoric. See, e.g., Emc FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE
MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CiviL WAR 76, 133, 228
(1970).
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by the people, but identify, interpret, and integrate such law differ-
ently, or blend this consideration with other constitutional concerns.
Nor, by the way, do we have to choose a pure version of any of
these theories-or only one of them, for that matter. One can easi-
ly imagine hybrids that mix different approaches, and we may want
to use more than one theory, depending on the issue.
I will return to these considerations in the next section. But,
first, consider what this discussion reveals about why Ackerman
thinks his theory is normatively superior to the others-the third
question mentioned above. Ackerman's theory is not distinguishable
on the ground that only it recognizes the "dualist" premise of
higher law made by the people, but it does differ from these other
theories in the extent to which it makes this consideration central;
Ackerman's may not be the only dualist theory around, but it is
the most dualist theory. Indeed, the whole interpretive apparatus
described in part I-identifying constitutional moments, translating
these into constitutional regimes, synthetically interpreting principles
across regimes-is designed specifically to heighten the emphasis
on facilitating dualist democracy.
And what's so great about dualism? With this question, we
come at last to Ackerman's motivation. By making dualism our
foremost consideration, Ackerman tells us, we shall encourage
something he calls "private citizenship."5 Private citizenship de-
scribes a particular attitude toward membership in a political com-
munity, one that strikes a realistic balance between full-time devo-
tion to the common good and relentless pursuit of self-interest.
At first blush, one might think the goal ought to be to encour-
age a life devoted to serving the community. An admirable goal,
perhaps, but hardly realistic. Most of us simply are not that good.
We care about ourselves, our family, our friends, the people we
touch, more than we care about strangers-even strangers with
whom we share a conceptual bond of citizenship. Making citizens
live up to the ideal of classical republicanism takes work, a lot of
work-hence all that talk during the Revolutionary period about
"converting men into republican machines,"51 the totalitarian over-
50. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 297 ("I will be exploring the way in which
the dualist tradition gives life and substance to the American practice of private citizen-
ship. This link, to my mind, will provide you with the single best reason for giving your
conscientious support to the American Constitution.").
51. MEYER, supra note 48, at 196 (quoting Benjamin Rush, who also advocated public
education as a way to make the "mass of the people more homogeneous, and thereby fit
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tones of which are uncomfortably close to the fascism of a later
day. And maybe this isn't such an admirable goal anyway. After
all, a life devoted to politics means a life not devoted to other
pursuits. It means a life without freedom as we have come to
understand the term, and a world without many of the opportunities
for excellence (dare I say virtue?) that make life satisfying.
On the other hand, a life devoted wholly to selfish interests
isn't much better. Who thinks that Ebenezer Scrooge at the begin-
ning of A Christmas Carol is an inspiring figure? Our lives and
fortunes are interdependent, and sometimes we must attend to our
role as member of a community, with all the responsibilities that
entail. Failure to do so may, among other things, be one of the
surest ways to lose our freedom, by making it easy for potential
tyrants to seize control of government. As corny as it sounds,
giving nothing, we risk losing everything.
"Private citizenship" denotes an intermediate position. It de-
scribes a world in which we are free, for the most part and most
of the time, to pursue our own interests, a world in which we can
choose to wear many hats. During ordinary times, we are asked to
sacrifice our private lives only to a relatively modest extent, by
voting and keeping abreast of important events. Every once in a
while, however, issues arise that demand more active involvement.
On such occasions, we must assume the full mantle of responsible
citizenship. In this way, we can govern ourselves without losing
ourselves to government.
This, then, is what motivates Ackerman's theory: to make a
world in which private citizenship can flourish.
iM. PUTTING THE "PRUDENCE" BACK INTO CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE
We can, I think, agree with Ackerman that "private citizenship"
is a normatively attractive idea; it enjoins a reasonable version of
civic responsibility while leaving room to investigate life's other
possibilities. Is it the most attractive conception of citizenship in a
republic, or even the most attractive one consistent with our history
and tradition? We don't need to decide, because there are problems
with Ackerman's prescribed method of interpretation even if it is.
Note, first, the disjunction between Ackerman's objective to
encourage private citizenship and his proposal to have judges make
them more easily for uniform and peaceable government").
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constitutional regimes "the basic unit of analysis."52 A constitu-
tional moment happens: the people speak, they do something. This
is good, Ackerman tells us; this is civically virtuous involvement
by "We the People" on an issue that matters. But how is this
involvement encouraged if, years or even generations later, judges
deduce some abstract principle from what the people did and apply
it in ways that "We" did not endorse and would probably have
rejected?53 Unless the idea is to encourage participation by goad-
ing the public to act, this seems positively perverse.
Put another way, aren't the demands of dualism and private
citizenship satisfied so long as courts give enactments of "We the
People" the force and meaning that was desired by the People
when they were enacted?54 For that matter, isn't reading such en-
actments to do more contrary to the premise of popular sovereignty
and the goal of encouraging private citizenship? In his eagerness to
create general principles and apply them to new problems, hasn't
Ackerman undermined his own theoretical premises? Not that argu-
ments cannot be made to justify looking to text for general princi-
ples that apply in ways unanticipated by those who enacted the law
from which they are derived. But these arguments are not
Ackerman's, and Ackerman's arguments cut against what he pro-
poses to do.
There is a more important question lurking here than whether
the needs of dualism and private citizenship can be met with some-
thing other than Ackerman's theory of constitutional regimes. For
even conceding that private citizenship is worth encouraging, why
should it be the foremost consideration in devising a method of
52. See supra note 21 (citing ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 59).
53. Consider in this light John Ferejohn and Barry Weingast's argument that a rational
lawmaker, seeking to maximize the effectiveness of its laws, might prefer courts to update
enactments in line with subsequent political preferences-which, if true, suggests an inter-
pretive regime very different from Ackerman's. See John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast,
Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992). Of
course, even assuming the validity of Ferejohn and Weingast's premise-that courts and
lawmakers pursue independent policy goals within a framework defined by economic
assumptions about rationality-this theory would not apply in Ackerman's world. For "We
the People" are not present, do not even exist, during normal politics, and "Our" prefer-
ences as higher lawmakers cannot be detected by asking what the majority favors at any
particular moment. The argument nonetheless suggests how complex the relationship be-
tween political action and judicial interpretation can be.
54. Hence the inescapable element of originalism detected by others in Ackerman's
theory. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 48, at 580-81; Klarman, supra note 17, at 777-84;
Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918, 924-27 (1992).
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interpretation, as it plainly is for Ackerman? Here we see the im-
port of some points made above, because this question becomes
especially cutting once it is conceded that other approaches may
serve this goal and that less than what Ackerman calls for is need-
ed to do so.
So consider the question that provides the title to this essay:
what's a constitution for anyway? For many things, of course. And
while encouraging private citizenship may be one of them, we have
no reason to think it is the most important purpose of a constitu-
tion, or even one particularly high on the list. Even more important
for our inquiry, which is centered on the role of courts, we have
no reason to believe-indeed we have reason to doubt-that the
Supreme Court plays a particularly important role in shaping the
attitudes of ordinary citizens toward their civic responsibilities."
And even conceding that what the Court does matters in this re-
spect, we have no reason to believe that its role is substantial
enough to justify subordinating other considerations that might go
into a theory of constitutional interpretation. Which is precisely
what Ackerman does: he takes one of the Constitution's objec-
tives-a background aspiration really, the kind of consideration that
ought to be a secondary or tertiary matter in deciding cases-and
elevates it all out of proportion.
The point, we now see, is utterly conventional (which may
explain why none of Ackerman's critics has made it): laws-and
this includes constitutions-are adopted for reasons, and we ought
to interpret them in whatever way best achieves their intendments.
Ackerman selects one of the Constitution's missions, one to which
courts make only a marginal contribution, and builds an interpre-
tive system around it at the expense of other goals and purposes.
As the remainder of this essay will attempt to demonstrate, adding
such considerations into the mix leads in a different direction than
generating interpretive "regimes"--and does so, for that matter,
without sacrificing either the premise of dualism or the desire to
encourage private citizenship.
55. I'm going to cite GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). I am aware of the criticism his book evoked,
especially from within the legal community (though I am more impressed by the book
than many others). But one needn't endorse Rosenberg's methodology or particular conclu-
sions to recognize the force of his point and acknowledge that, outside a relatively narrow
segment of the legal community itself, the Court's role in shaping attitudes toward politics
and the responsibilities of citizenship is pretty marginal.
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Start with a familiar example drawn from the discussion of
alternative theories in part II. As explained there, the approach
Ackerman calls "rights foundationalism" seeks to identify and
protect individual rights thought to be preconditions for liberal
democracy, a pivotal constitutional concern with a long pedigree.1
6
Yet, as Tushnet explains,57 Ackerman's theory is ill suited to ad-
dress this concern-hardly a surprise since the theory was not
conceived with this concern in mind and is largely indifferent to its
underlying considerations. If such rights are protected at all in
Ackerman's world, it is a mere fortuity. Rights foundationalists, in
contrast, are far kinder to Ackerman's concern for dualism. As also
mentioned in part II, the most common versions of this approach
limit popular sovereignty in order to strengthen it, and even the
more ambitious variants leave plenty of room for democratic self-
expression of the kind Ackerman says is needed to support private
citizenship. 8
The problem of individual rights has preoccupied American
constitutional scholars since the 1950s. It has not been the only
problem on the table, but questions about the Bill of Rights and
Reconstruction Amendments have largely driven the debate. I want
to look at a different function of the Constitution, however, one
more pertinent to a conference on Lopez-namely, the
Constitution's role in establishing a framework for workable, and
working, government.
It is, I take it, a truism that the chief task and first order of
business in writing a constitution is to construct institutions for
government's day-to-day operations. (Just look at our Constitution
or read the Convention debates, which are overwhelmingly con-
cerned with such matters.) Yet despite a recent surge of interest in
the problem of institutional design, it is fair to say that questions
of structure have received less care and attention than they deserve.
And while the Constitution's structural components share many
objectives with its individual rights provisions, they have peculiar
features too. Questions respecting the powers of or relationships
among governmental institutions need to be analyzed on their own
terms and in light of their own purposes. And, once again, it
would be surprising if Ackerman's theory of constitutional regimes
56. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text
57. See Tushnet, supra note 4, at 859-60.
58. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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did this well, for it was developed with a quite different (and
overly abstract) set of objectives in mind. In fact, Ackerman's
theory turns out to be a very bad way to handle structural issues.
Unlike the argument about individual rights, this point may be
less familiar and require elaboration. What sort of special consider-
ations apply when we confront the Constitution's structural compo-
nents? How should we think about interpreting the Constitution in
its role of establishing a workable framework for government?
Obviously, this is not the place to attempt articulating a compre-
hensive theory; nor would such a theory offer some startling new
technique. Interpretation in this area, as in others, is mostly a prob-
lem of teleology, of discerning purposes and arguing about which
choice suits these best; and the devil, as they say, is in the details.
Nonetheless, when applied to problems of institutional design, the
conventional model of purposive interpretation has some distinctive
features that bear emphasizing, not least because they underscore
drawbacks in Ackerman's regime theory.
The key characteristic is this: while the Constitution sets up or
recognizes various departments of government and allocates power
among them, this opening arrangement was neither expected nor
intended to be permanent. It was a starting position-an initial
distribution from which to begin, like the initial distribution of
money in a Monopoly game. The Framers believed it was a fair
and sensible arrangement, one suited to their circumstances as they
understood them. But they did not think it was permanent.
How do we know this? In part, because to maintain otherwise
is to treat the members of the Founding generation as if they were
fools-for only someone thickheaded could have failed to appreci-
ate that once a government this big, this complex, and this novel
was up and running (and by 18th century standards, this was a big,
complex, novel government), experience would reveal the need for
adjustments big and small. This was not even the kind of point
that needed to be made directly. It was, rather, a shared assumption
among intelligent men, one revealed mostly in responses to other
arguments. So, for example, irritated by the nitpicking, impractical
perfectionism of some Antifederalist opponents of the Constitution,
Madison querulously asked:
Is it an unreasonable conjecture that the errors which
may be contained in the plan of the convention are such as
have resulted rather from the defect of antecedent experi-
ence on this complicated and difficult subject, than from a
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want of accuracy or care in the investigation of it; and,
consequently, such as will not be ascertained until an actual
trial shall have pointed them out?59
Bear in mind, moreover, that the political science and history read
by the Founding generation was literally obsessed with problems of
change over time-as a result of both changes in material environ-
ment (fortuna) and political maneuvering (corruption).6 And it all
pointed toward a mix of institutions that, through their mutual
relations, could make adjustments as time passed without sacrific-
ing the basic commitments to liberty, good government, and civic
virtue. The Constitution is surely positive law, but it is more than
that. It is an organic charter for an entity that was meant to grow
and evolve.
What does this mean for the problem of interpretation, and
what does it have to do with Ackerman? To answer these ques-
tions, I want to draw (somewhat sheepishly) on two rather hack-
neyed metaphors. First is the old pragmatist image of sailors re-
building their boat at sea. This is usually offered to say something
about how knowledge develops: that we're not in a position to
rebuild our systems from scratch, that revisions are made on an
incremental basis, and so forth. The image also underscores the
point that, in deciding whether a problem exists or change is need-
ed, we had better be sure we understand what we're dealing with.
These are not just intellectual puzzles. We live with this stuff;
mistakes matter. If we don't know what we're doing, we can make
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 233 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The
point was occasionally made directly. Hamilton begins The Federalist No. 82, for example,
by noting:
The erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may
distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy and nicety;
and these may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from the establish-
ment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a
number of distinct sovereignties. 'Tis time only can mature and perfect so
compound a system, can liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and can adjust
them to each other in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE.
Id. at 491.
60. Although one would never know it from reading the legal literature, this is the
claim actually made by J.G.A. Pocock in THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975). Civic humanism,
in his story, is a solution to the age-old problem of how a secular government existing in
real time can prevent or forestall decay into undesirable forms. See also CAROLINE ROB-
BINS, THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN (1959) (describing the arguments
of radical Whig polemicists who were influential in the colonies).
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things worse. We can drown.
The image can also be useful in thinking about constitutional
evolution, if I may play it out slightly tongue-in-cheek. The Found-
ing generation had a problem, a series of problems really: they
needed a government with "energy," a government capable of
controlling affairs at home and dealing with other nations on an
equal footing; at the same time, they wanted a government that
would preserve liberty and property, respect the authority of states,
conserve civic virtue, reduce internal frictions, and so on. Drawing
from their own experience as well as the best political science
available, they designed a government they hoped could do all this.
And they launched it. But they were really just guessing what it
would be like at sea, because no one had sailed this particular
ocean before. And they knew that the needs of those aboard the
"ship of state" (so to speak) would change over time. Still, they
did the best they could.
We are the inheritors of that experiment, out at sea now for
some 200-plus years. Much of the original blueprint turned out to
be remarkably sensible. But with experience we found that all sorts
of adjustments were needed-some from flaws in the original de-
sign, others from what we learned in actually sailing these waters.
The result has been a regular custom of major and minor repairs.
Indeed, repairs are still being made all the time-by formal amend-
ment, by express legislation, by simple usage, or through the exer-
cise of bureaucratic discretion. And the changes are cumulative, as
each revision induces further adjustments (which may or may not
be self-conscious) and alters the baseline for subsequent develop-
ments. As a result, the ship's structure today is radically different,
and incredibly more complex, than it was at the outset.
Implications for interpreting and applying the Constitution seem
obvious. First, as time unfolds and adjustments are made, we must
not keep looking to the original design for answers. Whatever an-
swers it has to offer are, more likely than not, inappropriate: once
walls have been moved and new machinery installed, to act as if
these changes had not been made is a recipe for disaster. Govern-
ment is not a static abstraction; it consists of real institutions that
have been operating for a long time now, and we need to under-
stand how these work and how they came to look as they do if we
are to keep them running properly. Otherwise, we risk making
costly blunders from ignorance or partial vision.6'
61. Note how it also follows from this argument that, while we may not be able to
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Which brings me to my second clich: that government in a
modem industrialized democracy, especially one that is federated, is
like an ecosystem. It resembles an ecosystem in its complexity and
in the interdependent nature of its components. There are many
working parts, each with multiple connections to others, and what
happens to one part produces ripples that affect other parts. As
with any complex system, even small changes may have unfore-
seen effects; if handled improperly, these can become very large.
It does not follow that changes cannot or should not be made:
as with nature itself, the only constant in government is change.62
What this suggests, rather, is that we introduce changes with a
certain modesty. It suggests that we stop evaluating the desirability
of structural changes in the abstract or by reasoning from general
propositions about human nature and simple-minded slogans about
the meaning of complex historical events. It suggests learning as
much as we can about the nature and history of the particular
institutions in question-all of their history, too, not just their
beginnings and not just a few critical moments. And it suggests
inspecting proposed innovations carefully to make sure they are
properly formulated and adequately justified in their particular
context.63
We cannot avoid the risk of inadvertent distortion. We can,
however, minimize it by studying how government works and
avoiding carelessness in proposing to reform it. Hence, the title of
this section: putting the prudence back into constitutional jurispru-
dence. The institutional infrastructure of American government has
been unfolding for more than 200 years, and the interpreter's task
must take the logic and experience of that unfolding into account
turn to the original design for answers, we cannot ignore it either. This was, after all, our
starting position, and its traces are still felt everywhere. A proper understanding requires a
thorough knowledge of both the original design and the way it has evolved.
62. A useful summary of the new emphasis in ecology on shifts, redefinition, and
readjustment may be found in Stevens, New Eye on Nature: The Real Constant is Eternal
Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1990, at Cl.
63. Originalism is not the only culprit here. Far more common but just as troubling is
the practice of looking only at the Founding, and then merely to establish that it does not
provide an answer to a particular problem. Having thus "cleared space," the problem is
treated as completely up for grabs, with no further obligation to consider past practice.
This may be defensible in some contexts, but when it comes to questions of struc-
ture-federalism, separation of powers, the authority of different branches, and so on-it
is risky and shortsighted. Problems that were not foreseen in 1789 may have come up
later, and even if not, developments in other contexts may have altered the conceptual or
prudential space within which to work.
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as fully and realistically as possible.'
The problem with Ackerman's theory from this perspective
seems pretty obvious. Recall how the theory works: it singles out
particular moments at which proposals were adopted, calls for
judges to wrest from these abstract principles capable of very broad
application, and directs judges to use these principles to restructure
the larger constitutional framework, including a process of synthe-
sizing them with principles derived from earlier moments. Could
there be a worse, a more reckless way to approach problems of
structure? Rather than take institutions on their own terms and in
their own context, Ackerman interjects doctrines and principles
developed in other contexts and for other purposes. The principles
defining each new regime may sound appealing. But that's in the
abstract. Insofar as they are artificially manufactured without regard
for their particular suitability for the problems to which they are
now being applied, the most likely effect will be to introduce
pernicious distortions. (The image that comes to mind is one of
Court as Oedipus at the beginning of Sophocles's cycle, blundering
into plague-ridden Thebes to boast that he will get to the bottom
of the mess and only making things worse because he doesn't
understand that he is responsible for it.)6"
64. This prescription may sound something like the approach Ackerman labels
"Burkean historicism." See ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 16-24; supra note 44 and accom-
panying text. But Burke did not invent the idea of prudence, and he gets undeserved
credit for any suggestion that includes an element of relying on experience. Matthew
Hale, David Hume, and many others made the same point just as effectively long before
Burke. For Burke, moreover, tradition was a device to keep the "swinish multitude" from
thinking too much about how it might want to govern itself (a restriction he did not
think similarly bound him or others in his class). See Herzog, supra note 5, at 73. Be
that as it may, what I am proposing differs in important respects from Ackerman's de-
scription of historicism. Ackerman assumes that the historicist is conservative in the strong
sense of opposing innovation and seeking to minimize its effects. But change is fine, and
we should not hesitate to act where things could be made better. All I am proposing is
that we recognize the risk of unforeseen consequences that innovation poses and act care-
fully, which is not at all the same as acting conservatively.
65. Similar criticisms could be made of other constitutional theorists. Indeed, it may
seem surprising to see this criticism applied to Ackerman, who seems so much more
willing than most to dig in and study American history. But Ackerman's use of history
turns out to be deceptive because it is attached to a theory as unpragmatic as the most
ahistorical theorists. Whether or not Ackerman's historical claims are persuasive-and we
must await the publication of volumes two and three to make that determination-they
neither justify nor improve the interpretive undertaking he recommends.
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IV. WRENCHES IN THE WORKS: THE PROBLEM OF REGIME
THEORY ILLUSTRATED
The problem described here can be demonstrated easily enough.
Below I present some examples drawn from Ackerman's work,
though others may come to mind once the nature of the criticism
is made clear. The discussion concludes with some observations on
Tushnet's efforts to define a regime based on Lopez and other
recent developments.'
A. Reconstruction, Lochner, and the New Deal
The centerpiece of Ackerman's story is the New Deal: its
controversial introduction and ultimate triumph present, for
Ackerman, both the fundamental puzzle of modem constitutional
law and the paradigmatic example of higher lawmaking by the
people outside Article V. One might have thought the legitimacy of
the New Deal settled, by acquiescence if nothing else, but
Ackerman remains troubled by (what he says is) the conventional
explanation for the Supreme Court's switch from opposing to em-
bracing FDR's administrative program. According to Ackerman, the
"dominant professional narrative" teaches that the Federalists and
their allies on the Marshall Court established all the doctrinal com-
ponents of a modem welfare state in the early nineteenth century.
A century later, this work was ignored by a misguided Supreme
Court hoping to stymie progressive reform and impose its own
laissez-faire agenda on the nation. For a while, it looked as if these
justices might even succeed. But in 1937, under considerable pres-
sure from a frustrated President and public, the Court rediscovered
the original principles and executed its dramatic switch.67
Ackerman dubs this story "the myth of rediscovery." "In any
other field but law," he says, "it would be laughable to assert that
Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall did all the really tough
work in elaborating the constitution of the modem welfare state,
and that Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal Congress were basi-
cally acting out a version of active national government already
fully established by the People in the aftermath of the American
66. By way of disclaimer, this section reports findings from historical research I am
presently doing on the evolution of federalism in the United States. Although I am fairly
confident about the conclusions, space constraints preclude full documentation here. In this
paper, therefore, I confine myself to describing basic events to illustrate the kinds of
distortions Ackerman's theory can be expected to produce.
67. ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 61-62, 114.
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Revolution., 61 In place of this myth, Ackerman offers a different
version of events-one he prefers, among other reasons, because it
explains what happened without having to disparage the Supreme
Court's early twentieth century jurisprudence.
In a nutshell, Ackerman's story is that the Founding generation
established a decentralized republic but that a new constitutional
regime was established during Reconstruction. In synthesizing this
new regime with the old one, the Court established two principles:
(1) contract and property rights should receive enhanced constitu-
tional protection (i.e. Lochner); and (2) other limits on federal
power should be reaffirmed. Both principles operated legitimately
to impede legislative reform until they were repudiated by "We the
People" during the New Deal controversy of 1935-37.
Let's examine this story more closely to see how well it holds
up and what it tells us about the utility and desirability of
Ackerman's theory. According to Ackerman, the Founders neither
accepted nor rejected a modem welfare state they could not even
have conceptualized. What they established was "a decentralized
republic-in which American citizens could expect only limited
assistance from the national government in protecting their personal
freedoms against state politics."'69 This emphasis on limited nation-
al government and the primacy of states was reaffirmed during the
Jacksonian era. But then came the Civil War and "the Republican
assertion of a more nationalistic Union that would no longer toler-
ate the enslavement of any American by a dominant state majority
but insisted on equal protection of the laws."7
At this point, the Court faced a problem: it had to determine
what this change meant and synthesize it with the remains of the
earlier regime. Nor was it enough, Ackerman says, for the Court
simply to take these amendments on their own terms, which were
already pretty broad. The Court had to find a deeper meaning and
work out its more general implications. "Given Reconstruction,"
Ackerman tells us,
it was perfectly appropriate for courts to insist that the
nation was now committed to the guarantee of fundamental
rights in a deeper way. Surely it is hard to fault the courts
68. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional PoliticslConstitutional Law, 99 YALE LJ. 453, 491
(1989).
69. ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 100.
70. Id.
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of the Lochner era for taking this step; indeed it is hard to
see how any serious effort at synthesis could have moved
to a different conclusion.7
The problem, of course, was in choosing a direction for the new
constitutional synthesis. By definition, this task fell to courts, since
the mobilized public that adopted the Reconstruction amendments
addressed only the problems it addressed. One possible solution
was to give heightened protection to contract and property rights
generally. Although such protection was not specifically contem-
plated when the amendments were ratified, contract and property
were among the fundamental concerns of the Founding generation,
and the Civil War itself was about nothing so much as a free labor
market. At first, to be sure, the Court resisted moving in this direc-
tion, refusing to read the new amendments so expansively in the
Slaughter-House Cases.72
As time moved on, however, more Justices began taking
such generalizing questions more seriously. To put the
synthetic point in a single line: if the early republic gave
limited protection to the fundamental right of white men to
exercise their freedom through property and contract,
shouldn't the Reconstruction amendments be interpreted to
require equal protection to the fundamental rights of all
Americans to exercise their freedom through property and
contract?
73
The jurisprudence of the "bad old Court," of Lochner and laissez
faire, we thus learn, was not problematic at all. The Court was
simply engaged in an Ackermanian project of generating and syn-
thesizing norms to define the scope and meaning of a new consti-
tutional regime. The Court was right, in fact, to strike down all
that legislation.
It is anachronistic for the modem myth of rediscovery
to portray the Lochner Court as if it were abusing the idea
of constitutional interpretation by imposing its own idiosyn-
cratic and reactionary views on a polity yearning for the
New Deal. Like the courts of the early republic, the
Lochner Court was exercising a preservationist function,
71. Id.
72. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
73. ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 101 (emphasis in original).
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trying to develop a comprehensive synthesis of the meaning
of the Founding and Reconstruction out of the available
legal materials.74
Let's pause here for a moment. Ackerman is obviously pleased
about finding a way to vindicate the Lochner Court's foray into
regulating what is permissible social legislation. He is doubly
pleased because his solution enables him to say not only that
Lochner was right, but that so too was West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,75 which finally laid it to rest. (Parrish was correctly de-
cided because the synthesis of the post-Reconstruction Court was
"decisively repudiated by the New Deal Democracy that brought
the middle republic to an end." '76) By adopting Ackerman's ap-
proach to constitutional history and interpretation, we don't need to
repudiate anything the Court has done. It is the Court's critics who
are wrong-narrow-minded and anachronistic.
The instinct to show how all the cases were rightly decided in
context is familiar to lawyers schooled in the common law tradi-
tion. But constitutional theory involves more than apologizing for
the Court, especially for its bad decisions. Why should Ackerman
be pleased that his theory justifies Lochner, which was a terrible
decision? Surely I don't need to rehash these well-worn arguments.
Lochner was terrible not because the welfare state is definitely a
good idea, but because the decision about whether it is needs to be
debated in the ordinary political arena, not removed from normal
politics by judges.
This much, at least, is not anachronistic: Lochner was as sub-
stantively undesirable in 1905 as it was in 1937 or is today. There
is an old myth (speaking of myths) that the United States lagged
behind Western Europe in developing modem social policies, that
capitalists here were left free to do their worst until the 1930s. It
is a myth that Ackerman obviously believes, as evidenced by his
description of the political landscape when Lochner was decided.
74. Id.
75. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
76. ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 101.
77. My claim is not that Lochner was as obviously wrong when it was decided as it
has subsequently come to seem. There was, in fact, a respectable case to be made for the
Court's position at the time. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUION BESIEGED: THE
RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE, chs. 1-3 (1993).
The case was far from inevitable, however, and its undesirable consequences for progres-
sive reform were glaringly apparent from the start.
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According to Ackerman, 1905 was a time of laissez-faire trium-
phant, a time when activist government had been decisively repudi-
ated together with Populism and William Jennings Bryan:
In 1905, the Justices were not confronting a New Deal
Congress and a President who had just won decisive popu-
lar majorities in support of a decisive break with constitu-
tional laissez-faire. To the contrary: the Justices had just
lived through the failed Populist effort to mobilize the
American people against the evils of laissez-faire capital-
ism-a movement that climaxed with the nomination of
William Jennings Bryan as the Democratic candidate for
the Presidency in 1896. Rather than leading to a
Rooseveltian transformation, Bryan's nomination served
only to catalyze a decisive popular counterreaction on be-
half of William McKinley and the Republican Party."
Seen in this light, the Court's decision to constitutionalize econom-
ic libertarianism seems almost natural and certainly not the glaring
anomaly it has since come to be.
But the welfare state did not spring full grown from the fore-
head of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1933. On the contrary, as
Theda Skocpol has documented, the United States pioneered the
development of social welfare programs in the years after the Civil
War.79 And as she, Stephen Skowronek, and others have shown, a
substantial body of economic and social legislation was enacted at
both state and national levels between Reconstruction and the New
Deal.8" Remember the Progressives? In rejecting Populism, the
78. ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 101.
79. See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS (1992) (examining the
creation of pension systems and custodial institutions to aid Civil War veterans, which
served as a form of welfare for the elderly, as well as the widespread adoption by states
of social spending, labor regulations, and health education to help American mothers and
children along with working women who might become mothers); THEDA SKOCPOL, SO-
CIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE,
chs. 1-5 (1995); Ann Shola Orloff, The Political Origins of America's Belated Welfare
State, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 37-80 (Margaret Weir
et al. eds., 1988) (same).
80. See supra note 79; STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE:
THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877-1920 (1982) (examining
the creation and expansion of the civil service and federal administrative agencies, the
reconstitution of the army, and the regulation of railroads); see also Daniel J. Elazar,
Federal-State Collaboration in the Nineteenth-Century United States, in COOPERATION AND
CONFLICT: READINGS IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 83, 96-107 (Daniel J. Elazar et al. eds.,
1969) (describing joint state-federal programs during the years 1848-1913).
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public may have rejected a particular brand of government activ-
ism, but it hardly rejected the idea of using government to improve
the lives of citizens. It is more than ironic that Ackerman refers
here to the absence of a "Rooseveltian transformation" in 1905,
meaning Franklin, while missing the dramatic changes adopted at
this very time by Cousin Teddy and his Progressive allies.
The point is, Lochner was an unwarranted drag on democratic
politics from the start. And it provoked plenty of opposition,
too-though not so much as later, because the Court applied the
doctrine unevenly and did not, in fact, present a serious obstacle to
Progressive reformers.8' To the extent the Court was even a small
hindrance, however, why should we defend it? It would be one
thing if the people really had adopted the Lochner principle in a
constitutional amendment, or if economic due process was unavoid-
ably implied in the amendment they did enact. But Ackerman does
not, cannot, make these claims. The Court is, rather, extending
what the people did to a new problem (in a way they probably
would have rejected). And why? Not because economic due pro-
cess is so normatively attractive, but only because Ackerman's
theory requires the Court to give some sort of broader meaning to
amendments adopted during constitutional moments, and this was
the best the justices could do.
It's not bad either. If a generalization had to be wrested from
81. Hence, Charles Warren could write an article in 1913 entitled The Progressiveness
of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 294 (1913), in which, after can-
vassing both state and federal legislation and the Supreme Court's decisions, he criticized
those who claimed that the Court "stands as an obstacle to 'social justice."' According to
Warren, "[t]he years 1887 to 1911 inclusive have constituted the period most productive
of progressive and liberal-even radical-social and economic legislation in the United
States," and "so far from being reactionary, [the Supreme Court] has been steady and
consistent in upholding all State legislation of a progressive type." Id. at 294-95. Other
contemporary commentators made the same argument. See, e.g., Robert E. Cushman, So-
cial and Economic Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 20 MICH. L. REv. 737
(1922); Louis M. Greeley, The Changing Attitude of the Courts Toward Social Legislation,
5 U. ILL. L. REV. 222 (1910); Charles M. Hough, Due Process of Law-To-day, 32
HARV. L. REV. 218 (1919).
After 1918, the Court became considerably more aggressive and less progressive,
striking down many more statutes on due process grounds than before. See Roy A.
Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARv. L. Rv.
943, 944 (1927) (observing that the Court invalidated more legislation in the years 1920
to 1926 than in the previous half century). But even at its height in the 1920s, Lochner
never posed an insuperable impediment to Progressives. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 104-05, 151-52 (1960); Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality:
The Supreme Court and Protective Legislation in the Progressive Era, 1983 Y.B. OF THE
SUp. CT. HIsT. SoC'VY 52.
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the Fourteenth Amendment, I agree with Ackerman that Lochner
was a plausible choice in context. Here, then, is a good example of
Ackerman's theory working properly. And that's the problem.
Having created this problem, Ackerman isn't terribly troubled,
because his theory also purports to solve it. The Lochner Court's
synthesis of Founding and Reconstruction principles, Ackerman
tells us, was "decisively repudiated" in the New Deal.82 One
might, to be sure, quibble with this characterization: the Court
seemed to abandon economic due process before the great public
controversy, in 1934's Nebbia v. New York;83 and it is not clear
that substantive due process (as opposed to federal power) was a
key issue in the national election. But let's concede the point.
What if the election results in 1936 had been more ambiguous?
Would the Court have been wrong to abandon Lochner in 1937?
Under Ackerman's theory, once courts create these principles, get-
ting rid of them requires an extraordinary political consensus. But
why should so much effort be needed to undo judicial mistakes
that never should have been made in the first place, and why
should we be stuck with these mistakes unless we can surmount a
very high political barrier?
This point can be seen more clearly in Ackerman's treatment
of what he calls the "second element" of the post-Reconstruction
Court's constitutional synthesis, which limited "national interven-
tions in state affairs where [the] fundamental rights [protected by
Lochner] were not threatened."84 Modem lawyers deride the ef-
forts of judges in this period to impose principled limits on the
reach of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. But the
original Constitution "had refused to grant plenary power to the
national government, doling out only a limited set of enumerated
powers-a localist bias reinforced by the constitutional politics of
the Jacksonian era" and "[t]his textual strategy would have been
pointless if one of the enumerated powers-over interstate com-
merce-was read so expansively as to embrace the whole."85
Hence, Ackerman concludes, "it was reasonable [his italics] for the
middle-republican Justices to deny that Reconstruction had radically
displaced the Federalist-Jacksonian law on these matters":
82. See ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 101.
83. 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (upholding a state price control statute as not violating
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
84. ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 102.
85. Id. at 102-03.
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Although the enumerated power strategy was finally
repudiated by the American people, this happened in the
twentieth century, not in the eighteenth or nineteenth, and
we are wrong to condemn the Republican Justices for
failing to use the right crystal ball. Though we may proper-
ly quibble with the precise way the Justices drew their
lines around interstate commerce, they were not wrong on
the main point; before the New Deal, the People had never
self-consciously reallocated plenary power over the econo-
my from the states to the national government. 6
It's hard to disagree with the statement that nothing about
Reconstruction implied a transfer of plenary power over the econo-
my from the states to the federal government. Of course, the same
thing could be said about Lochner: nothing about Reconstruction
implied a limitation on the power of the states to regulate their
economies either, apart from ensuring that everyone had the same
basic civil rights. Both moves entail a stretch-and the same kind
of stretch, too. For the Fourteenth Amendment most definitely
transferred some power from the states to the federal government.
And while the transfer contemplated in 1868 may have been limit-
ed in scope, it does not require a whole lot more effort to extend
this to other powers than it did to extend the scope of the rights
protected from those originally contemplated to those protected
under Lochner.
More important, it is far from clear that a change in constitu-
tional law, as such, was either sought or required to uphold the
federal legislation in question. The need to prevent interstate
externalities had always been among the most straightforward argu-
ments for exercising federal power under the Commerce Clause.'
As originally conceived, this argument may have envisioned mostly
laws that were overtly protectionist, since the economies of the
states were largely independent in nature.8 Between the Civil War
86. Id. at 103.
87. As James Wilson explained to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention:
[w]hatever object of government extends, in its operation and effects, beyond
the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the gov-
emnment of the United States. Whatever object of government is confined in its
operation and effect, within the bounds of a particular state, should be consid-
ered as belonging to the government of that state ....
4 Elliot, supra note 7, at 424.
88. See, e.g., RICHARD MIDDLETON, COLONIAL AMERICA ch. 8 (1992); EDWIN J.
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and World War I, however, the states' economies became function-
ally integrated, and by 1930 practically everyone consumed or
produced goods bought and sold in other states. As product, labor,
and capital markets became nationally integrated, externalities be-
came commonplace, and the scope of the commerce power under
this traditional conception necessarily expanded.89 At first, the
Court seemed inclined to accept this change in status." Only later
did it pull back, fabricating distinctions like "commerce versus
manufacture" and "direct versus indirect" to preserve some sem-
blance of the original distribution of powers.
It is at least questionable, in this light, whether the post-Recon-
struction Court really was "preserving" the balance struck by the
Founding generation. There are, after all, and always have been,
two sides to federalism: not just preserving state authority, but also
enabling the federal government to act where national action is
desirable. If circumstances changed in a way that enlarged the
number of problems falling within the purview of Congress, an
interpretation that limited federal power to deal with them was
every bit as problematic as one needlessly expanding federal pow-
er.
91
Be that as it may, Ackerman's story is that the original Consti-
tution limited the power of the federal government to regulate the
economy, that the Reconstruction Amendments did nothing to alter
this decision, that the Court was therefore correct in the years after
Reconstruction to squelch federal efforts to extend national power,
and that "We the People" finally repudiated this judgment by
changing the Constitution in the late 1930s. The Court was right to
resist the New Deal in 1935-36, but also right to reverse itself in
1937.
Yet this conclusion begs the same "what if?" questions as
Lochner. What if Roosevelt's reelection in 1936 had been closer?
What if concern about the rise of fascism had diverted public
attention to foreign affairs? Would lawyers then have been wrong
PERKINS, THE ECONOMY OF COLONIAL AMERICA (2d ed. 1988); Richard B. Sheridan, The
Domestic Economy, in COLONIAL BRITISH AMERICA: ESSAYS IN THE NEW HISTORY OF
THE EARLY MODERN ERA 43-85 (Jack P. Greene & J.R. Pole eds., 1984).
89. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism, 1995 Sup. CL Rev. 345, 357-65.
90. See, e.g., Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1877)
(stating that powers granted under the Commerce Clause "are not confined to the instru-
mentalities of commerce" but "adapt themselves to the new developments of time and
circumstances").
91. This problem is thoroughly explored in Lessig, supra note 89.
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to condemn the Court for striking down federal legislation regulat-
ing national markets? Unless I completely misread Ackerman, the
answer must be yes, lawyers who made this argument would have
been wrong: "We the People" had limited federal power, and only
"We the People" could enlarge it. It may be that the limits were
hopelessly outdated by 1935, but the only way they could be al-
tered was through constitutional politics.
The problem with this argument is that it overlooks what actu-
ally happened during the sixty years between Reconstruction and
the New Deal. As suggested above, the originally limited national
government hardly remained unchanged until the modem welfare
state suddenly emerged fully grown in the New Deal. Recall the
metaphors from part II; government institutions simply do not
develop this way. And an interpretive system that acts as if they
do-that gives artificially exaggerated significance to a few mo-
ments while understating or distorting what happens in be-
tween-leads to precisely the sort of troubling conclusions that
Ackerman reaches.
With a more nuanced understanding of historical developments,
we can see how a position that was compelling in 1795 or 1835
could become less so by 1895 and much less so by 1925. By
1935, the Court was facing a fait accompli: the federal government
had already grown up, and it no longer made sense to insist on
outdated views about limited national government. The New Deal
called for a significant expansion of federal authority, to be sure,
but from a constitutional perspective, the increase was quantitative
rather than qualitative.
I cannot elaborate all the details of this argument here, but the
highlights should suffice to establish the point. During the 1830s,
America had stumbled into a political system that located power in
state and local party organizations operating on a spoils system.'
National parties existed, but were "little more than coalitions of
state parties formed intermittently to capture the presidency."93
This decentralized party structure bound the national government to
92. On the developments described in this paragraph and the next, see generally PAUL
KLEPPNER ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN ELECrORAL SYSTEMS (1981); PAUL
KLEPPNER, THE CROSS OF CULTURE (1970); THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS: STAGES OF
DEVELOPMENT (William N. Chambers & Walter D. Burnham eds., 1967); RICHARD
MCCORMICK, THE SECOND AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM (1966); ROY NICHOLS, THE INVEN-
TION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES (1967); SKOWRONEK, supra note 80.
93. Austin Ranney, Parties in State Politics, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 61,
61-99 (Herbert Jacob & Kenneth Vines eds., 1965).
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each locale by making national officials thoroughly dependent on
state and local political organizations. State parties organized inter-
nal government operations. They facilitated working relationships
within and among the branches and between different levels of
government. They controlled federal administration through patron-
age and spoils rotation, providing personnel to staff local federal
post offices, land offices, and customhouses. National officials
were, in effect, representatives of state party machines, and federal
patronage appointees became the ether connecting national govern-
ment to the states.
This unusual political system9 was quite durable. Sectional
conflict produced both Civil War and a major realignment in party
coalitions, but it scarcely disturbed the basic organizational pattern.
Indeed, the period after Reconstruction may have been the high
watermark of this system of governance.
One consequence of concentrating political power at the state
and local level was to limit the size and scope of the national
government. After early, ambitious efforts to control things from
the national level (like Hamilton's "Report on Manufactures" and
Henry Clay's "American System"),95 there was a marked diminu-
tion in federal activity. Apart from wartime measures and the smat-
tering of civil rights legislation enacted during Reconstruction,
Congress seldom flexed its muscles or tested the limits of its pow-
er.
By the late nineteenth century, a variety of changes in material
circumstances gave rise to increasing demands for action at the na-
tional level. To list but a few of these, the close of the frontier,
the rise of the city, the accentuation of class divisions, the end of
U.S. isolationism in foreign affairs, the decrease in electoral com-
petition after 1896, the industrial revolution, improvements in com-
munication and transportation, the national integration of labor and
capital markets, and so on, all put pressure on the national govern-
94. Unusual, at least, by comparison to contemporaneous European states. Hegel, in
fact, decided that the United States was not a "Real State" at all, arguing that it lacked
the national governmental forms needed to distinguish state from society. GEORG
FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 84-87 (Dover ed. 1956). Marx, in con-
trast, inverting this along with the rest of Hegel, saw the United States as "the most
perfect example of the modem state" because of the way it reflected the bourgeoisie's
impulse to balance democracy and capitalism in a single order. See KARL MARX & FRED-
ERICK ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 80 (C.J. Arthur ed. 1970).
95. These and other efforts are described in FRANK BOURGIN, THE GREAT CHALLENGE:
THE MYTH OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1989).
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ment to provide services that were difficult to offer under existing
political arrangements.
The result was a familiar kind of transformation, in which pres-
sures for reform were relieved first through established political
structures, producing hybrid forms that destroyed those structures
and led to their replacement by an independent, professional, feder-
al bureaucracy. Stephen Skowronek details these developments in
his marvelous book, Building a New American State. Focusing
in particular on the creation of a civil service, the
professionalization of the army, and the adoption of railroad regula-
tion, Skowronek documents this transformation through the McKin-
ley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson Administrations. "A state orga-
nized from the bottom up," he explains, "had to be reorganized
from the top down":
A state tied together by the procedures of spoils appoint-
ment had to be reoriented around the procedures of merit
appointment. A state operated in the interests of party
workers and party managers had to give way to the inter-
ests of a permanent civil service and a new intellectual
cadre of independent professionals. The challenge of con-
structing a new governmental order informed every stage of
the process of administrative modernization.
The organizational, procedural, and intellectual determi-
nants of the new American state crystallized around 1920.
New overhead machinery for the supervision of an expand-
ing arm of national administration had been put in place.
Over 70 percent of the executive civil service was in the
merit system. The new intellectuals had made themselves
indispensable in and around the high councils of govern-
ment. Viewed in these terms, Progressive state building
appears a paradigm of successful modernization achieved
through the gradual evolution of appropriate governmental
forms and procedures.97
The New Deal was undoubtedly a significant event. It heralded an
incursion by government into the private sector previously unheard
of in scope. But against the background of these earlier develop-
ments, the New Deal appears less the introduction of an unprece-
96. SKOWRONEK, supra note 80.
97. Id. at 209-10.
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dented new constitutional form than the enlargement of an existing
one. "The major constructive contribution of the New Deal,"
Skowronek concludes, "lay in the sheer expansion of bureaucratic
services and supports."98
Rather than recapitulate this story, the details of which needn't
concern us here, let me offer several measures to support its bot-
tom line. Approximately eight to ten administrative agencies were
created during the New Deal (depending on whom one asks). This
nearly doubled the previously existing number. But nearly doubling
means that a significant number of agencies already existed-all
created in the decades after the Interstate Commerce Commission
in 1887 and many regulating important formerly private markets.
These include the Federal Trade Commission (1914), the Tariff
Commission (1916), the Commodities Exchange Authority (1922),
the Federal Radio Commission (1927), the Water Power Commis-
sion (created in 1920 and replaced in 1930 by the Federal Power
Commission), and the Food and Drug Administration (1931).'
Regulation of markets through federal administrative agencies was
hardly new in 1933.
Number of agencies, however, may not be the best measure,
since most administration is performed by employees in the various
cabinet departments or by intermediate bodies that do not qualify
as directly regulating entities. Hence, a better measure may be the
number of federal employees (excluding military personnel). Once
again, the numbers show a meaningful rise during the New Deal
years, but nothing all that startling when measured against the
previous fifty years of bureaucratic growth. In 1881, for example,
the federal government employed 100,020 people."' By 1891,
that number had grown to 157,442. The next three decades saw an
enormous expansion: to 239,476 in 1901, 388,708 in 1910, and
655,265 in 1920. On the eve of the New Deal, in 1930, this num-
ber had dropped slightly, to 601,319. During the decade that fol-
lowed, the federal bureaucracy increased by another 60%--to
780,582 in 1935, 895,993 in 1937, and 953,891 in 1939-nothing
to snort at, certainly, but statistically less dramatic (even controlling
for population) than the growth in previous decades.'
98. Id. at 289.
99. Congressional Quarterly Federal Regulatory Directory 6-8 (7th ed. 1994); Center for
the Study of American Business, Directory of Federal Regulatory Agencies (3d ed. 1982).
100. The figures in this paragraph are drawn from I BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORI-
CAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 1102-03 (1989).
101. Evidence of another sort in support of this thesis may be found in the plaintive
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And where was the Supreme Court through all this? Present, of
course, but playing a part that scarcely resembles the unswerving
opposition of legal legend. The pattern of decisions suggests, rath-
er, uncertainty-about both what was happening and how to re-
spond. The Court had clear misgivings about Progressive legisla-
tion, but also qualms about acting too aggressively to derail gov-
ernmental experimentation. Prior to 1935, at least, and despite
unyielding antagonism from some Justices, the overall picture is
one of indecisive, unsteady, skeptical, grudging acceptance.
We have already seen this pattern in our discussion of Lochner
and substantive due process: there, the Justices certainly voiced
reservations in striking down a substantial amount of legislation.
But the Court sustained more regulations than it invalidated by
many orders of magnitude, and it declined to review even
more. 3 In 1934, on the eve of the New Deal crisis, the Court
went so far as apparently to repudiate economic due process alto-
gether, in Nebbia v. New York.' °
The same pattern emerges if we examine other doctrines. Take,
for example, the problem of regulating railroads, perhaps the single
most important American industry of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The Court's initial reaction to governmental
regulation, which began at the state level, was to affmn the broad
authority of states to regulate under their police power." That
decision, in turn, played a prominent role in prompting Congress to
enter the field in 1887 with the Interstate Commerce Act. But now
the Court reversed directions-accepting the constitutionality of the
Act while rejecting virtually everything the Interstate Commerce
Commission did and practically reducing the agency to gathering
cries of opponents of administrative government, who began complaining noisily long
before the New Deal. The most determined, and perhaps most prestigious, member of the
opposition may have been Roscoe Pound. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Phi-
losophy of Law, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 339 (1905); Roscoe Pound, Executive Justice, 46
AMER. L. REG. 144 (1907); Roscoe Pound, The Administrative Application of Legal Stan-
dards, 44 A.B.A. REP. 445 (1919).
102. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
103. For discussions of the of the Court's decisions, see WILLIAM SWINDLER, COURT
AND CONSTITUrION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1969), BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 153-68 (1942), THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1643-1709 (Lib. of Cong.
rev. ed. 1973), Urofskey, supra note 81.
104. 291 U.S. 502, 532 (1934).
105. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (upholding state regulation of grain
warehouses under the Fourteenth Amendment); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S.
155 (1877) (same for railways).
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statistics.1"e This, in turn, provoked a political backlash from the
Roosevelt Administration, leading to passage of the Hepburn Act in
1906, which overruled many of the Court's interpretations and
increased the powers of the Commission.0 7 The Court then
backed down, restricting the scope of judicial review of agency
orders and opening the way for more aggressive federal regula-
tion.'0
8
Similar stories may be told in other areas, as the Supreme
Court made room for activist government in a variety of ways
prior to 1937. During the same year that Lochner was decided, for
example, the Court in Manigault v. Springs"° interpreted the
Contract Clause narrowly and permitted a private contract to be
avoided through an exercise of the state's police power. Manigault
merely presaged the Court's much more dramatic interpretation in
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, ° which effec-
tively removed this clause as a limitation on state regulation. Simi-
larly, two of the administrative state's main support
beams--Crowell v. Benson.. and Humphrey's Executor -were
decided prior to the political crisis of 1936-37, and the Court left
standing a very modem looking federal grant-in-aid program as
early as 1923."' Even the commerce cases reflect nothing so
106. See, e.g., ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144 (1897); Maximum Freight
Rate Case, 167 U.S. 479 (1897); ICC v. Alabama, 164 U.S. 144 (1897); Import Rate
Case, 162 U.S. 197 (1896). These developments are discussed in WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY,
RAILROADS: RATES AND REGULATION (1912) and A.M. Tollefson, Judicial Review of the
Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 11 MINN. L. REv. 389 (1927).
107. Hepburn Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 584; see also JOHN MORTON BLUM, THE REPUBLI-
CAN ROOSEVELT (1954) (discussing Theodore Roosevelt's desire to regulate transportation
inequities, resulting in the Hepburn Bill); ARi HOOGENBOOM & OLIVE HOOGENBOOM, A
HISTORY OF THE ICC: FROM PANACEA TO PALLIATIVE 46-52 (1976); GABRIEL KOLKO,
RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916, at 155-76 (1965); Tollefson, supra note 106, at
504 (discussing the effect of the Hepburn Act on judicial review of ICC decisions).
108. ICC v. Illinois C.R.R., 215 U.S. 452 (1910) (upholding ICC authority to regulate
railway rates and practices); SKOWRONEK, supra note 80, at 259-67; Tollefson, supra note
106. The short-lived and ill-fated Commerce Court was a further product of the Court's
misconceived effort to stymie railroad regulation.
109. 199 U.S. 473 (1905).
110. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
111. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
112. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
113. Congress relied on its spending power under the General Welfare Clause to enact
the Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 224. This Act provided states with
federal funds to promote maternal health, and it was challenged by Massachusetts on the
ground that Congress had invaded powers reserved to the states. The Court refused to
entertain the argument, holding in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), that
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much as the Court's uncertainty about how to handle the emerging
regulatory state, as every Hammer v. Dagenhart"4 has its corre-
sponding Lottery Cases,"' and for every E.C. Knight 6 there is
a Shreveport Rate Case."7
By no means am I suggesting that the Supreme Court was in
the forefront of liberal reform in this period. But neither was it the
relentless and implacable foe assumed in the law's mythology. The
Court acted, rather, as a braking device-uncertain, skeptical, vacil-
lating. Here, as in Lochner, however, the Court left standing more
than it struck down, and while the Justices may have halted a few
initiatives, they did relatively little to prevent the emergence of a
modem state in the years prior to the New Deal.
So what happened in 1935 and 1936? The Court, in a word,
panicked. After all, the New Deal may not have been an entirely
new form of government regulation, but it was still pretty dramatic
in terms of sheer volume and breadth (particularly when viewed
against the background of developments in Europe), and it reflected
a very different political and economic sensibility. The President
and Congress thus asked an apprehensive Court to put all its mis-
givings aside and swallow a very large mouthful of innovative
social legislation all at once. Making matters worse, the first New
Deal statutes to reach the Court were poorly drafted and even more
Massachusetts lacked standing to sue. Justice Sutherland's reasoning in reaching this con-
clusion turns on the state's consent, the same ground the Court would later use to uphold
New Deal spending legislation:
In the last analysis, the complaint of the plaintiff state is brought to the naked
contention that Congress has usurped the reserved powers of the several states
by the mere enactment of the statute, though nothing has been done and noth-
ing is to be done without their consent; and it is plain that that question...
is political, and not judicial in character, and therefore is not a matter which
admits of the exercise of the judicial power.
Id. at 483.
114. 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (striking down a statute prohibiting interstate transporta-
tion of goods manufactured by child labor).
115. 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903) (upholding a federal statute regulating interstate trans-
portation of lottery tickets under the Commerce Clause).
116. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895) (refusing to apply
antitrust laws to monopolies at the end points of the stream of commerce).
117. Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 360 (1914) (permitting
the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate wholly intrastate transportation on the
ground that it affects interstate commerce). For more detailed discussions of the many
cases here, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
SEcoND CENTURY 22-30, 93-101, 173-181 (1990) and Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal
Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine from Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 108-27 (1992).
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poorly defended by government lawyers who were themselves not
convinced that the legislation was constitutional."8 The Court re-
acted, as one might have expected, by pulling back-which in this
case meant selecting from the inconsistent strands in existing prece-
dent those that limited federal power.
At the risk of sounding flip, perhaps the best way to under-
stand what happened is to say that the Court experienced what
lovers call "commitment problems." As in any new relationship
where one party is uncertain, the Court had been letting things
develop slowly, feeling them out-not committing wholeheartedly,
but also not saying no. But when the President and Congress sud-
denly presented the Court with the whole package and forced it to
choose, the Justices" 9 found that they were not yet ready to say
they loved the welfare state, much less to marry it. Several years
later, with more time to reflect, further pressure, and a new wave
of statutes that were better drafted and argued,' the Court relent-
ed.
The point is, the judicial reaction of 1935-36 was exceptional
and inconsistent with the gradual trend of the previous half century
toward judicial acquiescence in the emerging American regulatory
state. Note, by the way, how this understanding helps to make
118. See Cushman, supra note 117, at 131-32.
119. References in this paragraph to "the Justices" or "the Court" could, perhaps, be
replaced by "Justice Roberts."
120. See Cushman, supra note 117, at 139-46, for a discussion of the greater care that
went into drafting and arguing the statutes of the Second New Deal. In a forthcoming
book entitled "The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution," Cushman builds on his earli-
er work and takes strong exception to descriptions of the Supreme Court's decisions dur-
ing the New Deal era as self-consciously political. Cushman argues that the constitutional
developments were driven by doctrinal considerations and can be explained as a matter of
conventional legal evolution. Responding to my particular analysis, for example, he said
(in conversation) that the Court was not having "commitment problems" but was, rather,
"finicky about how suitors pressed their suits"; in other words, the Justices were respon-
sive to certain kinds of arguments, and choices among these explain the results.
Cushman is surely right that we have failed to study the doctrinal arguments careful-
ly enough and been too quick to attribute political motivations to the Court. It is, none-
theless, implausible to explain these developments entirely as a product of internal legal
debate. Competing arguments and conflicting lines of authority were always available, and
(as the progressive lawyers pointed out when the legal realists were still in diapers) choic-
es among these can only be made by looking outside the legal briefs. The Justices still
lived in the world, after all, and their sense of which arguments were or were not attrac-
tive at any given time was obviously shaped by it. Cushman's argument is still important
inasmuch as it helps us to understand how movement occurred, why it took the direction
it did, and why it may not have presented the severe problems of illegitimacy assumed
by sloppier critics.
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sense of details that stories like Ackerman's either overlook or fail
satisfactorily to explain. It makes sense of inconsistencies in the
decisions prior to 1937, which accounts like Ackerman's tend to
suppress or ignore. More important, it does not overlook the signif-
icant strides toward activist government that were taken in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ackerman may be right to
describe as "laughable" the claim that Alexander Hamilton and
John Marshall did all the hard work to establish the welfare state.
The same thing cannot be said about the work of Theodore Roose-
velt and Woodrow Wilson (among others). Equally laughable is
pretending that all the hard work was done by Franklin Roosevelt
and the New Deal Congress.
This explanation also makes better sense of the Court's deci-
sions in the years 1935-37. What else but an overwrought backlash
can explain Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, which ig-
nored Nebbia's plain intent to retire economic due process? What
better than panicky overreaction explains Railroad Retirement
Board v. Alton Railroad," in which the Court went farther than
it ever had in holding that Congress could not establish a retire-
ment system even for railroad workers indisputably engaged in
interstate commerce? And consider the opinion in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., which upheld the Wagner Act and sig-
nalled the Court's final acceptance of government's new direction.
As Barry Cushman has already observed (in an excellent article too
little noted), the opinion is a classic example of common law rea-
soning, in which the Court draws together the numerous precedents
favoring federal power that had accrued over the previous three
decades and reformulates them into a new rule. 24 Rather than
declare the creation of a new constitutional principle, the Court
looked back at its own prior decisions and found that this principle
had already taken hold. But for the reactionary decisions of the
previous two years, this would have been unexceptional." As it
was, the Justices merely resumed an odyssey they had begun many
years earlier.
121. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
122. 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
123. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
124. See id. at 34-41; Cushman, supra note 117, at 146-49. See also EDWARD H. LEVI,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-27 (1949) (discussing the line of precedents
leading to the Court's formulation of a rule).
125. Cushman, supra note 117, at 156.
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Ackerman is right to jeer at the "myth of rediscovery," but he
is wrong to replace it with his own version of Creationism: No
more than the world was the welfare state created in seven days,
or even 100. It evolved over at least a half century of political and
judicial turmoil. The New Deal marked a dramatic acceleration, but
it succeeded only because the institutional foundations had already
been laid.
From the perspective of law and constitutional interpretation,
then, we are not faced with a choice between saying that the wel-
fare state was established in 1789 and saying that it was created by
constitutional amendment in 1937. Neither statement is true. Some-
thing that would have been unconstitutional (as well as unthink-
able) in the early nineteenth century became more plausible (and
more thinkable) by the early twentieth century and compelling by
the time of the New Deal. The Constitution was "amended," for
those who insist on such positivistic language, through a slow
process of political and institutional evolution-exactly the kind of
development that Ackerman's theory obscures or distorts. By 1936,
the Court was on weak ground in taking the position it did, and
we should not have needed a constitutional "moment" to reverse it.
Amendment obviously remains one way to get past an obstreperous
Court, but a theory that leaves no other option because it ignores
the full progression and maturation of governmental institutions
leaves much to be desired.
B. Living in a Constitutional Moment? Tushnet on Lopez
I have argued that the hazards peculiarly associated with
Ackerman's theory of constitutional interpretation are imprudence
and hyperopia-imprudence because it tells judges to employ ab-
stract principles without sufficient regard for whether these are
needed or suited to make sense of the particular constitutional
provision to which they are applied, hyperopia because it gives
exaggerated weight to particular events at a distance while over-
looking or obscuring events closer up. As such, the theory poses a
high risk of error; we get decisions like Lochner, or we miss the
gradual but legitimate emergence of new forms through incremental
evolution. Tushnet's application of Ackerman's theory to Lopez
provides another illustration of these problems.
It is, of course, too soon to say we are now experiencing a
constitutional moment in Ackerman's terms-a point Tushnet ac-
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knowledges and explains in some detail.'26 The 1994 elections
were provocative, but cannot be treated as the sort of "triggering"
election required by Ackerman; the Contract With America might
satisfy Ackerman's requirement of a "proposal," except it is not
clear that people were yet paying sufficient attention. And the
wavering course of political events since the '94 elections are too
ambiguous to be called a political transformation. Things could go
that way, but we'll have to wait and see.
Let us nonetheless suppose, Tushnet muses, that this were the
sort of political revolution that qualifies as a constitutional moment
for Ackerman. What would it mean? We would, of course, have to
wait a number of years for judges to acquire sufficient perspective
to provide "the appropriate comprehensive synthesis."'27  But
Tushnet invites us to join him in a thought experiment by consid-
ering what such a synthesis might look like. At the very least, he
says, this may help us gain insight into how Ackerman's theory
works."
On the surface, today's political activity looks like a movement
to devolve power from the federal government back to the states.
But this is too obvious, too narrowly focused on the details of
Lopez and the Contract With America. We must consider these
events against a broader political background that includes other
notable developments of the day-developments like the accelerated
pace of deregulation, the reduction of a social safety net through
budget restrictions, increasing privatization in international trade,
and so forth. When we do this, Tushnet urges, we begin to discern
a deeper principle:
[T]he present constitutional moment, if it is one, may in-
volve the evaporation rather than the devolution of public
power. That is, power may not be flowing from Congress
to state and local governments, but rather going into thin
air-or, more precisely, to private institutions, both in the
United States and elsewhere. 29
Tushnet never spells out the implications of this interpretation,
one frequently offered by critics of limiting national power. But if
126. See Tushnet, supra note 4, at 848-50 (arguing that "the present situation cannot be
a constitutional moment").
127. Id. at 863; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 96-99.
128. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 846.
129. Id. at 869.
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the next regime were understood to reflect a principle of privatism,
the Court would presumably redefine government power in a vari-
ety of areas to limit state action in favor of private power. We
can't say exactly what this would look like, or what Tushnet thinks
it would look like, but the general idea seems clear enough.
This is, I think, a fair application of Ackerman's theory. It
looks beyond today's particulars to the broader background in a
way that is certainly plausible. Yet one needn't be an unregenerate
New Dealer to recognize that government serves useful purposes
and that we don't want needlessly to constrict its power to act.
The people may choose to do so, of course, in which case their
decision should be respected. But what does that have to do with
waiting a generation, looking back on today's events, finding a
general principle of dissolution, and using it to make government
power in other areas "evaporate"?
Perhaps Tushnet has simply generated a bad principle and
future interpreters will do better. But the risks seem high, and the
only reason Ackerman offers for taking them is that we need to
respect the voice of the people. Of course we do. But respecting
what the "People" did today does not require instructing the judges
of tomorrow to create broad principles that limit the people of
tomorrow in ways that "We" today never envisioned or desired.
V. CONCLUSION
Ackerman focuses on generalities and abstractions at the ex-
pense of the particular and the concrete. He constructs a method of
interpretation around one of the Constitution's most general ide-
als-that of preserving civic virtue by encouraging citizens to take
their responsibilities as constitutional lawmakers seriously-without
paying sufficient attention to its more particular goals. He pursues
this ideal by instructing judges to articulate 'and apply broad ab-
stractions without sufficient regard for the particular institutions to
which they are applied. The Founders were not afraid of abstrac-
tions, Ackerman protests, so why should we be different? 3' We
shouldn't. But the Founders did not wield their abstractions reck-
lessly, and they never invoked them just for the sake of invoking
abstractions.
Think of it this way: the hammer can be understood as an
expression of man's capacity to create and to control his environ-
130. ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 20.
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ment. But we use it to hammer nails, and when it comes time to
do some hammering, we would do best to focus on that. For if we
do our hammering by thinking about how the hammer represents
our ability to improve the world we inhabit, the only thing we're
likely to get is a sore thumb.

